From Hilbert's question to the universal machine
Hilbert asks for procedures that can settle any mathematical question. Gödel, Church, Post, and Turing prove that none exist and, to prove it, define what it means to compute.
Hilbert's 23 problems (August 8, 1900)
In 1900, Hilbert sets out the problems for the new century. The second asks for proof that arithmetic does not lead to contradiction; the tenth, for a procedure that decides whether an equation has a solution. The thread starts here.
Principia Mathematica (1910)
Meanwhile, Whitehead and Russell, following Frege, try to derive all of mathematics from logic. Their system is the one Gödel will put to the test.
The Entscheidungsproblem (1928)
Hilbert and Ackermann extend the tenth problem's request to all of logic: a procedure that decides whether any formula is valid.
The incompleteness theorems (1931)
Gödel proves that a system like that of Principia contains statements it can neither prove nor refute, and that it cannot prove its own consistency. Hilbert's second problem does not have the answer Hilbert hoped for.
The lambda calculus and an unsolvable problem (April 1936)
Church proposes that computing means whatever can be expressed in the lambda calculus, and with that definition answers no to the decision problem.
Finite Combinatory Processes (September 1936)
Post works in the line of Gödel and Church and describes a worker who marks boxes by following instructions.
On Computable Numbers (November 30, 1936)
Turing reaches the same boundary with an imaginary machine that reads and writes on a tape. A single one of them, the universal machine, can imitate any other: program and data are the same kind of thing.